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In Re an Application by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission for Judicial 
Review, the Supreme Court made unfavourable comments about Northern Irish abortion 
legislation in a way which showed complete disregard for elements of civil procedure 
which are a foundation of proper adjudication within the context of respect for democracy. 
This was but the latest of a number of cases in which the senior judiciary has made 




sovereignty of Parliament. In addition to Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, 
two other of these cases, Simmons v. Castle and R (Miller and another) v. The Secretary of 
State for Exiting the European Union, will be discussed. These cases reveal an effort to 





The immediate importance of Re an Application by the Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission for Judicial Review1 of course lies in its implications for the law of abortion in 
Northern Ireland, that law having been described in the Supreme Court (UKSC) as incompatible 
with the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). We have used the word ‘described’ because, for 
reasons which will emerge, this description was put forward as a result of a procedural 
innovation which was so extraordinary that it would make it quite wrong to say that the Northern 
Irish law was ‘found’ to be incompatible. Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission was 
the latest of a number of such innovations which, we submit, are the means by which judicial 
supremacy is now being surreptitiously created in the United Kingdom.  
 Though Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission is a paradigm case of a political 
character, analysis of it must begin by stating that much recent criticism of the United Kingdom 
judiciary for undermining the sovereignty of Parliament in order to take political decisions has 
been framed very poorly or even outright wrongly. The barrage of criticism which the House of 
Lords received for what turned out to be the protracted delay of the deportation of Abu Qatada 
failed to appreciate that, in the initial litigation at least, the Lords acted in a procedurally 
impeccable manner.2 The primary legislation under which the deportation was to take place was 
declared incompatible (and secondary legislation struck down). But this was merely the exercise 
of powers granted to the senior courts by Parliament under s. 4 of the HRA and it cannot be 
procedurally criticised as an assertion of judicial supremacy, though it is open to a more 
sophisticated criticism that the UKSC failed to give nearly sufficient weight to the intention of 
 
1 [2018] UKSC 27; [2019] All E.R. 173. 




Parliament expressed in the legislation found to be incompatible.3 The principal significance of 
this is that s. 4’s expansion of judicial competence benefits from input legitimacy;4 it rests on an 
Act of Parliament, one that, of course, was the occasion of very extensive debate, and much of 
the failure adequately to respond to the consequences of s. 4, or even to repeal it, are also acts 
(including omissions) of Parliament. 
 The situation is significantly different regarding HRA s. 3.5 The operation of s. 3 has been 
authoritatively described as allowing statutory interpretation to be turned into the ‘remoulding’ 
of statute in defiance of the intention of Parliament, a judicial power ‘more extreme’ than the 
strike down power under the United States Constitution,6 even though the HRA was enacted on 
the basis that Parliament would remain sovereign. Section 3 has given rise to an already 
enormous and still growing element of confusion and opacity as it is continually denied that 
merits review is being conducted under its influence when indeed it is. These denials have been a 
long way away from the forthrightness of Lord Hoffmann’s refusal to agree with the 
Government even that there was a state of emergency obtaining in the Qatada case, and so the 
 
3 D. Campbell, ‘The Threat of Terror and the Plausibility of Positivism’ [2009] Public Law 501. 
The simultaneously extremely expensive and ineffective changes to deportation law, procedure 
and practice which have followed from this decision exemplify what the authors believe is the 
futility, and worse, of attempting to create a ‘dialogue’ between the courts and Government (and 
Parliament): id., at 510-11 and D. Campbell, ‘The Threat of Terrorism: David Campbell 
Responds to Clive Walker’ [2010] Public Law 459. 
4 The argument can, indeed, cogently be made that Parliament’s intention requires a greater use 
of s. 4: S. Wilson Stark, ‘Facing Facts: Judicial Approaches to Section 4 of the Human Rights 
Act 1998’ (2017) 133 Law Q. Rev. 631, at 633. 
5 J. Allan, ‘Statutory Bills of Rights: You Read Words In, You Read Words Out, You Take 
Parliament’s Clear Intention and You Shake It All About – Doin’ the Sankey Hanky Panky’ in 
The Legal Protection of Human Rights: Sceptical Essays, eds. T. Campbell et al. (2011) 108. 
6 J.D. Heydon, ‘Are Bills of Rights Necessary in Common Law Systems?’ (2014) 130 Law Q. 




claim of input legitimacy for s. 3 is markedly less convincing than for s. 4. Nevertheless, both the 
passage of s. 3 and the failure to do much about it or to repeal it are decisions of Parliament. 
 However, a number of recent cases,7 of which R (Miller and another) v. The Secretary of 
State for Exiting the European Union 8 is the most important and Re Northern Ireland Human 
Rights Commission is the most recent, have much advanced the creation of judicial supremacy in 
the United Kingdom in a way which enjoys no input legitimacy at all because these cases have 
done their work in an opaque manner, amounting to an abuse of civil procedure, which has not 
generally been understood because the vast preponderance of the United Kingdom electorate 
could not possibly have understood it. The modern history of the appellate courts of the United 
Kingdom shows those courts, though having something of a reputation for employing what 
Llewellyn called the ‘formal style’ of adjudication,9 to be wholly capable of departing from that 
style and embarking upon judicial legislation. Nor has the manner in which this has been done 
always been confined merely to judicial activism in reasoning.10 This is true even in relation to 
 
7 No attempt has been made to identify all of the relevant cases. We have picked the three which 
are the major staging posts in the process of procedural innovation we seek to describe. A fuller 
account would, for example, place Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission in the 
context of the unnecessary declaration of incompatibility in R (Johnson) v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department [2016] UKSC 56; [2017] A.C. 365. Such an account would also, of 
course, point out that the process has not been uniform: see, for example, the caution displayed 
in R (Black) v Secretary of State for Justice [2017] UKSC 81; [2018] A.C. 215.  
8 [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin); [2017] 2 W.L.R. 583 and [2017] UKSC 5; [2017] 2 W.L.R. 621. 
9 K.N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition (1960) p. 38. 
10 One of the current authors has sought to show that Hedley Byrne and Co Ltd v. Heller and 
Partners Ltd [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.) was the result of judicial legislation which involved a 
sacrifice of respect for the facts of the case to what was dogmatically conceived to be a virtuous 
reform of the law: D. Campbell, ‘‘The Curious Incident of the Dog that Did Bark in the Night-
time: What Mischief Does Hedley Byrne and Co Ltd v Heller and Partners Correct?’ in The Law 
of Misstatements: 50 years on from Hedley Byrne v Heller, eds. K. Barker et al. (2015) 111; D. 
Campbell, ‘The Absence of Negligence in Hedley Byrne v Heller’ (2016) 132 Law Q. Rev. 266 
and D. Campbell, ‘The Consequences of Defying the System of Natural Liberty: The Absurdity 




the degree of activism which the current authors believe was an all but inevitable unwelcome 
consequence of the passage of the HRA.11 But the cases discussed in this article are, it is 
submitted, of a different nature. They are wholly questionable, not merely because they have 
given effect to a wish of the senior judiciary to create judicial supremacy over matters which the 
United Kingdom constitution had until recently (as a great democratic achievement) generally 
sought to make the province of Parliament, but also because what has been done has been done 
in so deplorable a way that we most reluctantly are obliged to call it surreptitious. 
 
SIMMONS V. CASTLE 
Before turning to Miller and Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, it is very 
instructive to consider an earlier case which is of an unusual sort to include in a discussion of 
constitutional law: Simmons v. Castle, a case on damages for personal injury handed down by 
the Court of Appeal in 2012.12 One of the current authors has discussed this case at length 
elsewhere and here we will give only a very brief account of it, referring readers to that previous 
discussion for further detail and authority.13 It is first necessary to inform readers of the 
background to the case. 
 
Expectations, and the Making of the Legal Doctrine, eds. TT. Arvind and J. Steele (forthcoming 
2020). 
11 An unacceptably excessive number of asylum and immigration cases have, in the authors’ 
opinion, interpreted art. 8 so as to give tantamount to no weight to the public interest manifestly 
expressed in the relevant legislation: D. Campbell, ‘“Catgate” and the Challenge to 
Parliamentary Sovereignty in Immigration Law’ [2015] Public Law 426. In one recent 
sentencing matter, the court simply refused to impose what it acknowledged was the statutorily 
required sentence on the basis of an art. 8 argument the court raised itself which gave no weight 
to the public interest: D. Campbell, ‘Decency, Disobedience and Democracy in Immigration 
Law’ [2018] Public Law 413. 
12 [2012] EWCA Civ 1039 and [2012] EWCA Civ 1288; [2013] 1 W.L.R. 1239.  
13 D. Campbell, ‘The Heil v. Rankin Approach to Law-making: Who Needs a Legislature?’ 




 Fundamental reform of civil procedure at the turn of the twentieth century allowed civil 
litigation to be funded by variants of contingency fee previously unknown or prohibited in the 
United Kingdom. This led to an explosion in personal injury claims and litigation which even 
those in favour of the personal injury system and of this way of funding litigation, including the 
author of the reform himself, found to be of great concern. The conduct of the legal profession 
which lost, and still has not regained, a defensible balance between the pursuit of the public 
interest and pursuit of fee income drew particular criticism. A most authoritative review of the 
funding of civil litigation, which the Government had commissioned an eminent member of the 
senior judiciary to undertake, confirmed the undesirability of a situation which the legal 
profession’s conduct had played a substantial part in creating, and made two recommendations to 
deal with that situation. These were: first, under what we will call a ‘reducing’ recommendation, 
that the fee arrangements which had been brought into disrepute be abolished or radically 
modified; but secondly, under what we will call an ‘increasing’ recommendation, that the 
damages for personal injury be increased so as to ensure that the funding for litigation was not 
overall reduced. Though this increase could therefore be described, and was described in 
Simmons v. Castle, as an increase in compensation of the claimant, there can be no doubt that its 
purpose was to maintain the level of funding of personal injury litigation. This is to say, the bulk 
of the increase was intended to end up in the hands of the legal profession, the same lawyers who 
had brought about the state of affairs necessitating the review of civil litigation in the first place. 
 It is our opinion that whilst there was public support for the reducing recommendation, 
there would have been no such support for the increasing recommendation designed to give back 
to the legal profession what the reducing recommendation had taken away. It was always 




about by an Act of primary legislation. By contrast, the increasing recommendation would have 
been seriously in jeopardy were it to have had to encounter the hazards of Parliamentary debate, 
which it did not since it was brought about in a way which allowed these hazards to be 
circumvented. 
 In Simmons v. Castle, Court of Appeal approval of a personal injury damages settlement of 
a sort which would normally be dealt with by a single Lord Justice of Appeal on papers alone 
was used as the occasion to uplift the relevant damages in every case across England and Wales. 
It is not really possible to regard this case as civil litigation at all. The case was in a most 
important sense not even actually heard because the interests of the nominal parties played no 
role in it and there was no argument whatsoever before the court. A most impressive bench, 
comprised of the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls and a particularly distinguished 
Lord Justice of Appeal, was nevertheless assembled, not so much to hear this case, but to use the 
pretext of doing so to engage in an act of judicial legislation by passing the increasing 
recommendation. The court prescribed a 10 per cent uplift in damages for non-pecuniary loss. In 
effect, this amounted to convening a legislative panel for the purpose of passing a change to 
personal injury law, and therefore also to insurance law, which was of greater consequence than 
most primary legislation. One is simply at a loss to explain on normal constitutional 
understandings how this legitimately could have happened. 
 It is not that Simmons v. Castle was entirely without precedent, if this is the right word. In 
2001 in Heil v. Rankin,14 the Court of Appeal had prescribed an earlier uplift for damages for 
non-pecuniary loss. As the interests of the nominal parties did not feature in it, Heil v. Rankin, 
like Simmons v. Castle, was a masquerade of a judgment proper, although it had a number of 
 




detailed procedural differences from Simmons v. Castle, most notably a large number of 
intervening parties engaged in what was in reality a policy argument about levels of damages. 
Perhaps the major driver of Heil v. Rankin was Professor Andrew Burrows who, as common law 
Law Commissioner between 1994-1999, had overseen the production of a series of Reports on 
damages which recommended something like the step taken in Heil v. Rankin. The Commission 
explicitly considered using the courts (in the circumstances this meant the Court of Appeal) to 
uplift damages because it seemed unlikely such a measure could be taken through Parliament. 
Hence the Commission decided not to try to overcome the obstacles this Parliamentary route 
would have presented but instead arranged for the bringing of Heil v. Rankin – which it did with 
great success by means Burrows afterwards characterised as ‘a close working relationship 
between the Law Commission and the judiciary’.15 
 Looking back on Heil v. Rankin some years later, Professor Burrows made what he 
believed was its justification extraordinarily clear: 
Perhaps oddly for a former Law Commissioner, I have never been a great fan of legislative 
reform of the non-criminal common law. Indeed, my years at the Law Commission merely 
served to reinforce my legislative scepticism … the vagaries of the legislative process 
mean that whether time is found for legislation depends almost entirely on whether one can 
fit one’s law reform within the political imperatives of the day and has little, or no, 
relationship to the quality of, or necessity for, the reform proposed … At root my approach 
may rest on a belief that our judges are to be trusted on developments in the common law 
in a way that our politicians should not be. 
 This legislative scepticism means that, for example, I think judges should be very 
wary of leaving possible reform of the common law to the legislature. [I am very critical 
of] arguments that, because the legislature has not enacted some reform, it is the intention 
of Parliament that there should be no reform of [the relevant common law]. The truth is 
that there is a myriad of reasons why Parliament may not have legislated on a matter and it 
is incorrect to regard [this] as necessarily reflecting a considered choice. 
 The upshot of this is that, while we at the Law Commission did not achieve fully 
what we had hoped in terms of the precise level of increase, the decision in Heil v. Rankin 
 
15 A. Burrows, ‘Alternatives to Legislation: Restatements and Judicial Law Reform’ in English 
and European Perspectives on Contract and Commercial Law, eds. L. Gullifer and S. Vogenauer 




was a triumph in terms of the methodology of law reform. It showed what could be 
achieved by a close working relationship between the Law Commission and the judiciary. I 
am convinced that, had we waited for legislation, we would still be waiting … if like me, 
you trust judges and have some scepticism about legislation in relation to English private 
law, there are alternatives … reform of the common law can be achieved by the judges, 
even in areas where it might at first sight seem that legislation is the only way forward.16 
 Were we to seek to criticise what was done in (Heil v. Rankin and) Simmons v. Castle – 
and we mean criticise in terms of the constitutional propriety of how it was done, saying nothing 
about the substance of the matter – then we would say only exactly what Professor Burrows has 
said, but append the question ‘who needs a legislature’? 
 
MILLER  
Of course it is not publicly known – one supposes, despite Professor Burrows’ frank comments, 
that it will never be adequately known by the public – just how the arrangements made for Heil 
v. Rankin and Simmons v. Castle were arrived at. What is certain is that the then Master of the 
Rolls, Lord Neuberger, not only sat on the bench in Simmons v. Castle but also will have been 
involved in making those arrangements in his capacity as the Head of the Civil Division. Lord 
Neuberger provides a link to the second case it is necessary to consider, Miller, for when Miller 
came before the courts, Lord Neuberger was, of course, President of the UKSC. The current 
authors have considered the constitutional implications of this case elsewhere,17 one of them 
 
16 id., pp. 43, 47, 50. 
17 J. Allan, ‘Democracy, Liberalism and Brexit’ (2018) 39 Cardozo Law Rev. 879 and D. 
Campbell, ‘Marbury v. Madison in the UK: Brexit and the Creation of Judicial Supremacy’ 
(2018) 39 Cardozo Law Rev. 921. M. Elliot et al. (eds.) The UK Constitution After Miller (2018) 
appeared after these articles were published and, though it would be desirable to do so, need not 
be considered here. In the authors’ opinion, none of the contributions to this collection, not even 
that of Sir John Laws, requires basic changes to the views expressed here, in the articles just 
mentioned, and in D. Campbell and J. Young, ‘The Metric Martyrs and the Entrenchment 




focusing upon the procedural aspects of Miller,18 to which we now turn in more detail. The 
discussion of the case will again be kept as brief as possible, and for a fuller account supported 
by reference to authority readers are again referred to that procedural article. 
 Miller could not have been heard in a more politically contested atmosphere. This led to 
most unfortunate claims about the influence of the personal views of those deciding the case vis-
à-vis the desirability of membership of the European Union, and we wish to dissociate ourselves 
from such claims. Miller’s principal constitutional significance lay, not in its implications for 
membership of the European Union, but in its judicial confirmation that the United Kingdom 
constitution recognised the existence of constitutional statutes. Such higher status statutes are 
diametrically opposed to the very basis of Diceyan Parliamentary sovereignty and were formerly 
entirely unknown to the positive law of England and Wales. They were first recognised (we 
would say invented) in the 2002 decision of the Divisional Court in Thoburn v. Sunderland City 
Council,19 the significance of which was that it elevated The European Communities Act 1972 to 
the status of a constitutional statute; which status it certainly has if there are such things as 
constitutional statutes at all. Though Thoburn had previously been approved by the UKSC, and a 
preliminary list of constitutional statutes including the 1972 Act had been put forward,20 Miller 
absolutely turned on affirming that the 1972 Act had constitutional status; and since it has that 
status, then a list of such statutes, though its precise membership may be disputed, must follow. 
As constitutional statutes are to some degree entrenched, their recognition incontrovertibly 
increases the power of the judiciary because what must effectively be a constitutional court is 
 
18 Campbell, id.  
19 [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin); [2003] Q.B. 151 (D.C.). 
20 R (Buckinghamshire County Council and others) v. Secretary of State for Transport [2014] 




necessary to decide on the relationship of constitutional statutes to ordinary law, as is precisely 
what happened regarding the 1972 Act in Miller. Of course, as things stand at present the status 
of these judicially denominated constitutional statutes shields them only from implied repeal. Yet 
even that alone replaces Diceyan sovereignty with a form of judicial supremacy administered by 
a constitutional court. But it would only be in line with the growth of judicial power since the 
passage of the HRA, and we submit it is to be expected, for this to lead to the judicial 
development of further protection for constitutional statutes, ultimately to the point of protection 
against incompatible primary Acts of legislation. This would create what might be called full 
judicial supremacy.21 
 Now there are, of course, strong and well-known arguments for entrenchment and, indeed 
for judicial supremacy and a concomitant constitutional court. But if such a major constitutional 
change were to be brought about in the United Kingdom, surely its legitimacy would depend on 
this being done in a democratically acceptable and transparent way, and we shall return to this. 
At this point in our argument we wish to show only that ‘open and transparent’ is the last 
description that should be given to the transformation now taking place in the United Kingdom. 
The public does not remotely grasp the significance of these judicially created constitutional 
statutes, and this is inextricably linked to the procedural steps taken to make Miller possible, 
which could not possibly be understood by the public.22 
 
21 The reader is reminded that it is our view that the remoulding of statute under HRA s. 3 
conveys a greater power to the courts than the strike down power under the United States 
Constitution. It is also the case that, whereas the result of Miller was that the Supreme Court told 
Government, and therefore Parliament, that what became The European Union (Notification of 
Withdrawal Act) 2017 had to be passed, the United States Supreme Court has never 
contemplated telling the Executive and the Congress what legislation they had to pass.  
22 This is rather poignantly expressed in a ‘self-help’ book Mrs Miller published which, amongst 




 The basic structure of the senior domestic courts of England and Wales, and thus for our 
purposes the United Kingdom, remains as it was established by the immense reform of the fusion 
of the common law and equity jurisdictions under the nineteenth century Judicature Acts, with 
the creation of the UKSC in 2009 not changing this in a way of relevance to us. That basic 
structure encompasses three levels of court. The High Court, which also is a court of appeal from 
inferior courts and tribunals, is the court of first instance for more ‘complex and difficult’ 
matters. From the High Court there is appeal to the Court of Appeal, from which there is final 
domestic appeal to the UKSC. The general jurisdiction of the High Court has three Divisions: the 
Chancery Division, the Queen’s Bench Division and the Family Division. There are specialist 
courts within these Divisions, and the Administrative Court, which hears most judicial review 
applications, is a specialist court of the Queen’s Bench Division. 
 Now, the first instance hearing of Miller did indeed take place in the London seat of the 
Administrative Court in the Royal Courts of Justice, and the official transcript of this judgment 
does indeed tell us that it was a matter ‘In the High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division’. It 
bears the Neutral Citation Number [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin) and almost all the public debate 
about Miller has been based on the belief that it began as a ‘High Court’ case. This belief is 
mistaken in a very important way. 
 The High Court judiciary is mainly composed of up to eighty puisne Justices of the High 
Court, plus some Deputy High Court judges who sit in inferior courts as well as in the High 
Court whilst in the process of being elevated to the High Court. In normal High Court 
proceedings, one of these judges sits alone. These judges are highly distinguished, almost always 
 





having had considerable experience of judging in the inferior courts and tribunals from which 
they are recruited, as well, of course, as having experience of highly successful legal practice – 
academic entry to the senior judiciary being vestigial. A few senior judges are also members of 
the High Court, the most important of whom is the Lord Chief Justice, the Head of the Judiciary 
of England and Wales. The Lord Chief Justice’s duties are predominantly administrative, and 
(putting to one side the exceptional occasions when he23 has sat as an ‘acting’ judge of the 
UKSC) his own duties as a judge sitting in the Court of Appeal or the High Court are of course 
focused upon matters of particular gravity. He therefore predominantly sits in the Court of 
Appeal and his normal role in the High Court is as a member of the Divisional Court, which will 
be described below. We are aware of only three reported cases in which the Lord Chief Justice 
sat as sole judge in the High Court,24 all of which were cases of exceptional public importance. 
 When certain matters which are required to be heard by the High Court but are of a 
particular complexity or gravity, the bench may be of two or more judges, and this specially 
constituted bench is called a Divisional Court. A three member bench is, however, rare and a 
Divisional Court is usually composed of a High Court judge and a more senior judge drawn from 
the Court of Appeal. Thoburn was a paradigm instance of the Administrative Court sitting as a 
Divisional Court, being a judicial review matter in which Crane J., a High Court judge, simply 
agreed with the senior Laws L.J., who was no doubt asked to sit because of his particular interest 
in constitutional matters.  
 
23 There has never been a female Lord Chief Justice. 
24 Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v. Boots Cash Chemists (Southern) Ltd [1952] 2 Q.B. 
795 (Q.B.D.) (Lord Goddard C.J.); Smith v. Leech Brain and Co. Ltd [1962] 2 Q.B. 405 (Q.B.D.) 





 The official transcript of the first instance judgment in Miller tells us that the court was a 
Divisional Court, and more legally sophisticated comment has referred to the case, not as a 
matter before the High Court, but as a matter before the Divisional Court. The bench that heard 
Miller at first instance was, however, composed of Lord Thomas of Cwmgeidd C.J., then Lord 
Chief Justice, Sir Terence Etherington M.R., the Master of the Rolls, and Sir Philip Sales L.J., 
then a Lord Justice of Appeal. In other words, no puisne justice of the High Court was involved. 
Hence, not only is it misleading to describe this as a ‘High Court bench’, but we are unaware of 
any previous Divisional Court ever having been composed in this way.25 In truth, this was a first 
instance hearing by the Court of Appeal, and indeed by a bench of that court which was as 
distinguished as one can really conceive, not only because of the eminence of the Lord Chief 
Justice and the Master of the Rolls, but because Sales L.J., whose previous career included 
distinguished service as the senior legal representative of the Crown, was particularly qualified to 
hear the case. We believe this way of handling an application for judicial review, indeed of any 
civil matter, is unique in post-war English legal history, differences with earlier legal procedure 
making any wider ranging claim unhelpful. 
 Any decision of this court would be bound to be regarded as extremely authoritative, but 
the power of this decision was increased by it being, still uncommonly, handed down as a single 
judgment. Nevertheless, from the outset there was never any doubt on the part of any legally 
informed commentator that that judgment, whatever it was, would be appealed to the UKSC. The 
reader will immediately see that the normal three level court system was thereby reduced to two 
 
25 One of the earlier attempts to review issues arising from membership of what is now the 
European Union was heard by an extremely distinguished Divisional Court composed of, in 
addition to a High Court Judge, two Lords Justice of Appeal: R v. Secretary of State for Foreign 




levels (or even, in reality, one level). In the very first Practice Direction it issued, the UKSC 
retained the longstanding practice of ‘exceptionally’ allowing ‘leapfrog’ appeals in civil matters 
from the High Court direct to itself, the statutory power enabling this specifying that the appeal 
may be from either ‘proceedings before a single judge of the High Court … or … a Divisional 
Court’. The nature of the bench which heard Miller at first instance surely strains this conception 
of a leapfrog appeal. The leapfrog is, of course, intended to be over the Court of Appeal, as is 
emphasised by a later practice direction stipulating that when leave to make such an appeal is 
sought because ‘the proceedings entail a decision relating to a matter of national importance or 
consideration of such a matter’, then leave should be granted ‘only … where … it does not 
appear likely that any additional assistance could be derived from a judgment of the Court of 
Appeal’. This would not, of course, be likely in Miller, as the first instance court effectively was, 
as we have said, a Court of Appeal bench, and one as distinguished as one could conceive. Any 
other Court of Appeal would be of less standing, making it in fact impossible for the Court of 
Appeal as such to hear a Miller appeal. 
 There were further extraordinary procedural features about Miller when it reached the 
UKSC. The UKSC is currently composed of eleven Justices, though it may have as many as 
twelve. Of course, the UKSC normally sits as a bench of five, though seven is by no means 
unknown. Miller was heard by all eleven Justices. This was the sole occasion so far on which the 
Court has sat en banc, and in addition was also the largest bench ever assembled in modern times 
to be the United Kingdom’s domestic court of final appeal. The then recently entirely refurbished 
premises of the UKSC struggled to accommodate, not just the public, but also those participating 
in the hearing. The latter group included (leaving aside those concerned with a specifically 




all of whom had the benefit of over fifty legal representatives, including twenty two Q.C.s! Over 
20,000 pages of documents supported the arguments of this multitude, with additional academic 
arguments also playing a part. What is more, the physical bench itself had to be extended so as to 
allow all the Justices themselves just to have a comfortable seat! The proceedings were in 
various ways televised with an extent of coverage that was unprecedented, though it should be 
said that television broadcasting has become a quite common feature of UKSC proceedings. As 
emerges even more clearly from the written arguments of the parties and from the full transcript 
of the hearing which have been made publicly available than from the judgment itself, this 
multitude did not really hear an appeal so much as just go through the entire matter again ab 
initio. 
 These absolutely unprecedented court arrangements are the spectacles which constitute an 
attempt by the senior judiciary to create a United Kingdom constitutional court.26 Now, it may be 
said that the magnificence of the arrangements made for hearing Miller were entirely appropriate 
to a constitutional court. But who decided there should be a constitutional court? The 
arrangements for the conduct of the business of the senior courts are rightly left very flexible in 
the hands of the senior judiciary. But this flexibility imposes a serious duty – we submit it 
amounts to a constitutional convention – on the senior judiciary to manage the business of the 
courts in the public interest. Yet by arranging the hearings of Miller in such a way as to create 
the trappings and appearance of a constitutional court, without any public discussion whatsoever 
 
26 Because its proper treatment would require treatment at a length which cannot be 
accommodated, because as a statutory measure it does not fall within an article on judicial 
procedure, and because, as this was drafted it was impossible to say what the fate of this 
legislation would be, we will not comment on the way the HRA is accorded the status of a 
constitutional statute in the European Union (Withdrawal Act) 2018, s. 9(3)(e), though this 
legislative entrenchment of the HRA obviously would constitute an even greater, indeed a 




of whether a constitutional court should be created in the United Kingdom, the senior judiciary 
momentously failed in the performance of that duty. The public ignorance of what has been done 
is nowhere better evidenced than in the way that the first hearing of Miller continues to be 
understood to have been a hearing in the High Court when it really was nothing of the sort. 
  Some inkling that a sort of constitutional court has been created has, of course, begun to 
dawn amongst our political leaders, and one interesting example of this coincidentally occurred 
on the day the United Kingdom gave notice of its then intention to leave the European Union, 29 
March 2017. The readers of this journal will be aware that the House of Lords Select Committee 
on the Constitution has annual discussions, called ‘evidence sessions’, with the Cabinet Ministers 
of Government responsible for the legal system and with the senior judiciary. During the 29 
March session, one of the members of the Committee, Lord Morgan, fulsomely congratulated 
Lord Neuberger, then President of the UKSC, and Lady Hale, then Deputy President, on having 
in Miller ‘effectively’ created a ‘constitutional court’, an arrangement which Lord Morgan 
proposed might be put on a ‘more formal’ basis. Addressing the then President, he asked: 
We had a series of very significant statements by the Supreme Court about the question of 
legal certainty in the case of Mrs. Miller, in which my colleague Lord Pannick was 
involved, which in a way was fortuitous. Mrs. Miller was a lone protester who won her 
point in the courts. It is fortunate that this was done, because we benefited from it hugely, 
and I hope the Government benefited from the wisdom of the Supreme Court. Would you 
think there was any merit in having a more formal arrangement on that? In effect, the 
Supreme Court, by pronouncing the eternal verities on the sovereignty of Parliament, acted 
as a constitutional court, as they have in France and other countries. Would you feel that a 
more formal structural relationship for that could be created?27 
 
27 H.L. Select Committee on the Constitution, Corrected Oral Evidence with the President and 






 Kenneth Morgan is a retired academic historian of distinction who has held important 
administrative posts in British higher education, including the Vice-chancellorship of the 
University of Aberystwyth. He was elevated to the Labour benches of the House of Lords by Mr. 
Blair in 2000, shortly after Mr. Blair’s Government had passed its reform of that House. Lord 
Morgan’s views may be regarded as representative of informed and influential left-liberal, lay 
opinion on constitutional matters. We fear, nevertheless, that the naïve Lord Morgan’s 
intendedly helpful question was something of a faux pas. The creation, not to mention the formal 
creation, of a constitutional court was a matter not publicly to be discussed by the true 
cognoscenti. The then President’s reply, far from seizing the opportunity the question obviously 
offered, was most equivocal, eschewing anything concrete about what should be done in the 
United Kingdom and instead vaguely reviewing the various constitutional systems of the world. 
Neither did the then Deputy President comment on the point. Lord Pannick, to whom Lord 
Morgan refers, a person who has been central to the developments discussed here, not least in his 
capacity as Mrs Miller’s counsel, who was present as a member of the Committee, also did not 
take up this opportunity. 
 
RE NORTHERN IRELAND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION 
There is a very strong case that Lord Neuberger, who must look upon what was done in Simmons 
v. Castle whilst he was Master of the Rolls as a very ordinary procedural achievement compared 
to what was done in Miller whilst he was President of the UKSC, should now be regarded as the 
United Kingdom’s John Marshall, with Miller his Marbury v. Madison.28 And this Marbury has 
 




not had to wait half a century for its Dredd Scott.29 Very shortly after Lord Neuberger’s 
retirement, the UKSC handed down another case in which procedural innovation signally 
advanced the creation of a supreme judicial power. In Re Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission, not only were there no parties whose particular interests were being adjudicated 
upon, but having itself decided that for this reason it could not hear the matter, the UKSC 
nevertheless went on to describe the legislation at issue in the case as incompatible. In the most 
sweeping way imaginable, a general power of human rights review unlimited by the most 
rudimentary requirement of standing was thereby created. In Re Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission, the UKSC abandoned the tedious necessity of adjudication completely, at least the 
pretence of which had been, however implausibly, maintained even in Simmons v. Castle, in 
order to pass a judicial verdict of sorts on a statute which did not find favour. 
 By way of background, the Good Friday Agreement required that a Northern Irish Human 
Rights Commission should be created as an ‘independent’ agency charged with promoting and 
monitoring respect for human rights. This was done under the Northern Ireland Act 1998 s. 68. The 
Commission’s main function is to advise Government on desirable changes to legislation, but it may 
also, under s. 69 of the 1998 Act, bring court proceedings or assist individuals doing so in human 
rights matters. In 2015, the Commission was granted judicial review of the legislation specific to 
Northern Ireland under which abortion is available on a more restricted basis than in the rest of the 
United Kingdom. Crucially, and although the Commission naturally referred to actual abortion 
experiences in its argument, it brought this case as a wholly abstract matter. No interests of any 
specific litigant were involved. What the Commission sought was ‘general relief, unrelated to any 
 
29 Dredd Scott v. Sandford 60 U.S. 393 (1857). On its facts, Re Northern Ireland Human Rights 




particular sets of facts’;30 in other words an abstract declaration that the Northern Irish legislation 
was incompatible with various sections of the HRA. 
 Though the Commission undoubtedly has the power to bring proceedings, whether it has the 
power to bring a case in this abstract way is a different issue. It is in the first instance a matter of 
statutory interpretation of the powers the Commission was given. In the course of discussion of this 
specific question, the UKSC made comments of a more general nature on the possible review of 
HRA compatibility in Northern Ireland and in the United Kingdom as a whole. A majority of the 
expanded, seven member UKSC, composed of Lord Mance, Lord Reed, Lady Black and Lord Lloyd 
Jones, found that the Commission did not have the necessary powers. The specific and general points 
made are, of course, in themselves of great importance as they bear on how litigants might in future 
bring human rights arguments.31 For reasons of space we can, however, ignore them here as their 
significance for the concept of standing and its implications for human rights review, indeed for the 
very concept of adjudication in human rights cases,32 was eclipsed by what a ‘shadow’ majority, if it 
can be put this way, went on to do. 
 The minority which had decided that the Commission had standing, Lady Hale, Lord Kerr and 
Lord Wilson, were joined by Lord Mance and in part by Lady Black in describing the Northern 
Ireland legislation as incompatible with art. 8, while Lord Kerr and Lord Wilson further described it 
as incompatible with art. 3. One cannot really say that they found the legislation to be incompatible 
because their descriptions were categorically and deliberately obiter. Put as bluntly as the matter 
requires, a shadow majority of the UKSC described legislation as incompatible when it was not 
merely questionable whether the party bringing the action had standing to do so, but after the UKSC 
itself had already found the party did not have standing. This, of course, should have ended the 
 
30 Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission [2018] UKSC 27; [2019] All E.R. 173 at [43]. 
31 id., at [18]. 




matter.33 It did not. The substance of the description of incompatibility is irrelevant to the procedural 
issues arising from this deliberate production of obiter conclusions which undermine the actual 
finding in the case, which opens up the question whether parties can review any such legislation as 
they think fit and on such abstract human rights grounds as they choose. This is a radical expansion 
of HRA s. 4 which it was, with respect, completely wrong of Lady Hale to conflate with what 
previously had been understood of declarations of incompatibility.34 The direction of travel that has 
been taken is indicated in a representative lay comment in an article in The Times that in Re Northern 
Ireland Human Rights Commission the UKSC ‘had found that Northern Ireland’s [abortion law] was 
incompatible with human rights law but rejected a legal challenge against it on a technicality’.35 The 
readers of this journal may be forgiven a smile at the legal crudeness of this claim, but surely it is the 
case that the UKSC has reduced the basis of legitimate adjudicative interpretation of statute to a 
technicality; or indeed to nothing. This potentially huge expansion of human rights review greatly 
increases judicial power, and it is surely highly objectionable that it has been brought about by the 
judges themselves in a way which – it having been found that the Commission had not been granted 
the necessary powers – enjoys no democratic legitimacy whatsoever. 
 Though it is perfectly clear what will happen in respect of the Northern Irish legislation,36 it is 
completely unclear how the new power will generally be exercised. Re Northern Ireland Human 
Rights Commission makes it necessary to belabour the obvious and state that the whole justification 
of judicial interpretation of legislation is that, whilst legislators have the democratic legitimacy 
initially to pass general legislation, it is necessary for the courts to hone the meaning of that 
 
33 id., at [334], [365]. 
34 id., at [40]. Lady Hale believed that the UKSC left Parliament with three alternatives: id., at [39].  
35 M. Moore, ‘Radio 4’s News Quiz is Censured for Anti-Tory Bias’ The Times, 1 November 
2018, 11. 
36 We have left this as it was drafted, prior to the developments described in the text associated 




legislation when it is applied to concrete sets of facts which it is impossible that legislators could 
completely anticipate. The job of judges is to determine the meaning in specific circumstances of the 
general legislation that was passed by the legislature. It is true that judges, like a referee in a sporting 
competition, have the final authoritative say in the application of the rules. But as Hart famously 
made clear, ‘the scoring rule remains what it was and it is the scorer’s duty to apply it as best he 
can’.37 The scoring rule, in other words, is not whatever the referee says it is. The power of review 
that is developed in Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission has indefinite and potentially 
infinite scope because it departs from the previously understood basic sense of the adjudicative 
interpretation of legislation which tied it to concrete sets of facts.  
 One cannot speak of a ratio or precedent with regard to the description of incompatibility, but 
what of the example that proceeding in this way has provided for future human rights challenges to 
potentially all legislation? 38 There is no point speaking of possible legal limits because the example 
set by Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission is to ignore legal limits even when 
acknowledged. We are in absolutely uncharted procedural waters in which the very distinction 
between Parliamentary legislation and adjudication has been broken down, for what does the Assent 
mean if it can immediately be challenged? It is submitted that it is impossible for any court to 
develop a coherent and consistent policy towards review on this potentially infinite basis, and 
towards the reviews which will inevitably now be brought. Such reviews will be brought in an ad hoc 
basis that will inevitably be unacceptably shaped by applicants’ political and financial resources. 
 
37 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2012, 3rd edn.) p. 142. 
38 Though we shall not discuss it further here, whilst it very well may have been the intention of 
the judicial creators of this new situation that applications will be confined to challenges based 
on the Convention grounds, it is not the case that there is anything in Re Northern Ireland 




 The first indication of the future will,39 as a practical matter, emerge in respect of the Northern 
Irish abortion law itself. Lady Hale was surely right to argue that the issue of standing to challenge 
that law was an ‘arid question’.40 Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission obviously left it 
open to the Commission (and to any other body that roused itself to action) to find a party concerned 
in the way required and in one way or another to bring the case under the standing of that party.41 
What is more, the Commission (and conceivably any other party) will be very much encouraged to 
take the effort to locate such a party because the matter has now already been argued in a way which 
will be highly instructive to anyone wanting to argue for incompatibility. After all, those judges who 
reached the conclusion the legislation was incompatible have already laid out the necessary 
 
39 See n. 36 above. 
40 Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission [2018] UKSC 27; [2019] All E.R. 173 at [11]. 
Lady Hale strangely spoke in the past tense, of what the Commission might have done to ‘have 
found women’ themselves with standing, leaving one wondering why the Commission had not 
proceeded in this way. 
41 After this was drafted, a successful attempt to do exactly this was made. Ms Sarah Ewart, who, 
with the support of Amnesty International, was an important force behind bringing Re Northern 
Ireland Human Rights Commission and was an intervener in the case, was on 24 October 2018 
given leave to seek judicial review in her own capacity: Ewart, Re Judicial Review [2018] NIQB 
85 (available on BAILLI). 
 Whilst it is not central to the argument of this article, it is significant that the ground on 
which Ms Ewart was given leave was, in the opinion of the current authors, who have considered 
their language very carefully, preposterous, though it was not challenged by the Northern Irish 
Departments of Justice and Health (id., at [10]) and in the court’s view ‘It is clear (and indeed 
uncontentious) that … leave … is appropriate’ (id., at [6]). In 2013, Ms Ewart conceived a child 
who was diagnosed at 12 weeks with a grave foetal abnormality which condemned her or him to 
being stillborn or to a very early death. Deciding to terminate her pregnancy, Ms Ewart had to go 
to England to do so. She has since had a successful pregnancy and intends to have more children, 
though she is not now pregnant, and is undergoing treatment to minimise the risk of a repetition 
of her loss. The ground on which she sought to challenge the Northern Ireland legislation was 
that ‘if I become pregnant there is an increased risk that I will be in an identical position that I 
faced in 2013’: id., at [3]. 
 As it effects the argument of this article, comment on this submission is perhaps 
supererogatory as, on the facts as reported in the press, the necessity of circumlocution does not 
seem to have been entirely grasped by those framing Ms Ewart’s case. A person working for 
Amnesty said of the leave application that ‘Sarah is taking this case not just for herself, but for 
all the women in these circumstances’: A. Erwin and D. Young, ‘Woman Cleared to Challenge 




arguments, and even those who did not do so were not entirely able to avoid being drawn into the 
substantive argument. Lady Black, for example, has to be counted amongst the shadow majority that 
put forward the description of incompatibility because she felt she ‘should express [her] view as to 
the substance of the Commission’s appeal, as other members of the court have done’.42 
 In making these comments we hope we should not be thought unmindful of the role of 
precedent, or of the possibility of finding instruction in reported arguments, or even of not 
recognising that the formal and informal correction of mistakes in the procedural or even substantial 
pleading of a case before a court is common in inferior courts and tribunals and is not unknown in 
senior, and even the appeal,43 courts.44 This is wholly different from telling those who might wish to 
litigate a matter which has never been properly brought before the court what they would be wise to 
plead should they bring such a matter in future. Readers will find it hard to accept but it is the case 
that the UKSC has told parties in advance what is very likely to be the result of future litigation of 
matters never properly brought before the court! Having found that a claimant had no standing to 
seek a ruling about the compatibility of particular legislation, the UKSC nevertheless went on to 
identify the arguments by which it might in future be established that the very same legislation 
 
42 Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission [2018] UKSC 27; [2019] All E.R. 173 at 
[366]. Even Lord Reed, with whom Lord Lloyd-Jones agreed, felt obliged to offer a substantive 
opinion that the legislation was not incompatible, although he was sure it was inappropriate to 
offer any such opinion: id., at [335].  
43 A remarkable example, which can, it is submitted, be coherently distinguished from Re 
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, is R. (on the application of Buckinghamshire C.C. 
and others) v. Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3; [2014] 1 W.L.R. 324 at [93]-
[97]. It is, however, conceivable that some their Justices who agreed with Lord Reid’s judgment 
did not see it this way. 
44 The applicant’s identification of respondents in Ewart, Re Judicial Review [2018] NIQB 85 
was based on a ‘scattergun tactic’ (id. at [5]), and her application was able to be ‘clearly and 
coherently formulated’ only by a ‘quite disproportionate investment of judicial resource’ (id., at 
[91]). This case was, to remind readers, brought by an applicant assisted by arguably the world’s 
most prominent legal charity concerning a matter which had already substantially been heard by 
the UKSC! It is important to ask what, as a practical matter, are now the effective controls over 




was incompatible! This is nothing more nor less than telling potential parties how a case they 
may bring in future regarding that legislation will be decided. It will encourage those who have 
been told they will win (unsurprisingly) to bring such a case. This is not adjudication as 
adjudication has previously been understood in the constitutional theory and practice of the United 
Kingdom, nor in the common law generally. It is adjudication in advance; that is, it is not 
adjudication at all. 
 We wish to emphasise that our comments do not pertain to the substance of the abortion 
legislation. Nor are they focused on the desirability or otherwise of the courts actively seeking to 
involve themselves in undeniably ‘political’ cases – though we would not wish to dissimulate over 
our intense opposition to the latter. Fundamentally we have nothing to add to what Lord Reed (with 
whom Lord Lloyd-Jones agreed) himself said of the ‘legalisation of political issues’ in Miller45 and 
in Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission.46 Our focus here is not on the unsatisfactory 
nature of what was done but rather on the far more unsatisfactory nature of how it was done. This 
raises different issues to which we now return by way of conclusion. 
 
CONCLUSION 
That influential currents of legal opinion are currently seeking to establish judicial supremacy in 
the United Kingdom is not a point which can be disputed. No doubt this is in part because, as we 
 
45 Miller [2017] UKSC 5; [2017] 2 W.L.R. 621 at [240]: ‘[i]t is important for courts to 
understand that the legalisation of political issues is not always constitutionally appropriate, and 
may be fraught with risk, not least for the judiciary’. 
46 Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission [2018] UKSC 27; [2019] All E.R. 173 at 
[362]: ‘These are highly sensitive and contentious questions of moral judgement, on which views 
will vary from person to person, and from judge to judge [and so] are pre-eminently matters to be 




have acknowledged, important arguments for it can be, and over the years have been, made.47 
The current authors make no pretence to disinterest, and wish to be frank about their opposition 
to judicial supremacy as an extremely undesirable alternative to sovereignty of Parliament (and 
to other forms of electoral sovereignty appropriate to other jurisdictions).48 Our position with 
regard to the specific argument of this article is, however, that stated by Goldsworthy in his 
magisterial book. In the United Kingdom: 
Judicial review of the validity of legislation would require a fundamental constitutional 
change … which should be brought about by consensus, rather than judicial fiat. That is 
surely a requirement of democracy itself.49 
We believe this article describes the attempt surreptitiously to exercise such a judicial fiat.  
 We have approached the question of the extension of judicial power from an unusual 
direction. We have focused on the way that three recent cases show the United Kingdom’s senior 
judiciary to be intent on increasing its own supreme power at the expense of that of the elected 
Parliament. All three cases have advanced this power in a procedurally opaque manner which 
has not been understood by the United Kingdom electorate for the very good reason that it could 
not possibly be understood by it. Indeed, we very regrettably are obliged to submit that all three 
cases must be described as surreptitious abuses of judicial control over civil procedure as part of 
an attempt to advance judicial supremacy. 
 
47 On the economic and social context of the legal and political movement away from the 
Diceyan constitution see D. Campbell, ‘Gathering the Water: Abuse of Rights after the 
Recognition of Government Failure’ (2010) 7 J. Jurisprudence 487, at 507-34 and D. Campbell, 
‘Dicey in the Age of Globalisation’ (2011) 17 European Public Law 571-98 
48 See, for example, J. Allan, ‘Do Judges Know Best?’ (2017) 32 Constitutional Commentary 
479; J. Allan, ‘Against Written Constitutionalism’ (2015) 14 Otago Law Rev. 191 and J. Allan, 
‘Why Politics Matters’ (2018) 9 Jurisprudence 132. 




 We repeat, however, that it is no part of our intention to argue that the senior judiciary is 
being crudely political in the way it was widely alleged it had been in Miller. The problem is the 
opposite of this. We have no doubt that the senior judiciary criticised here sees the expansion of 
judicial last-word power as enormously valuable and is motivated by virtue when seeking to 
create it. Unfortunately, the criticism of the untrammelled pursuit of virtue as having dire 
political consequences that has played a crucial part in modern political philosophy50 seems to 
have played no part in the thinking behind the measures described in this article. What is perhaps 
more telling against the senior judiciary than a lack of familiarity with political philosophy is a 
lack of knowledge of the intersection between political philosophy and jurisprudence which, in a 
strong sense, is the foundation of its powers. Such knowledge would reveal that, even more than 
license, excess of virtue was the mischief against which Montesquieu believed the separation of 
powers to be the necessary ‘arrangement of things’: 
Political liberty is found only in moderate governments … It is present only when power is 
not abused, but it has eternally been observed that any man who has power is led to abuse 
it; he continues until he finds limits. Who would think it? Even virtue has need of limits.51 
 The astounding and commendable – it is a great constitutional achievement – extent of 
public confidence which the United Kingdom judiciary enjoys involves a very great degree of 
autonomy in making procedural arrangements for the conduct of the business of the courts. Now 
regarding itself as increasingly unbound from the constitutional confinements of the sovereignty 
of Parliament in its pursuit of a constitutional end of judicial supremacy, which we have no 
doubt it sees as a public good, the senior judiciary has made arrangements which the public does 
not understand, much less consent to, and those arrangements are therefore democratically 
 
50 G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History (1956) p. 450: ‘Robespierre set up the principle of 
Virtue as supreme, and it may be said that with this man Virtue was an earnest matter’. 




unjustifiable. So few checks and balances does the senior judiciary at present encounter that it 
has been able to do this surreptitiously because, having freed itself of the conventions of 
sovereignty of Parliament, it is at the moment, we are obliged to submit, out of control. 
